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Conceptual model that both technology and volume uncertainty promote exchange partners to rely on the network 
norm of information sharing which is the necessary ingredient of the network embeddedness. Data was collected 
from the 143 manufacturers in high-tech market in which triadic relationships among the manufacturers (seller), their 
first vendors (first buyers), and the second vendors (customers of the first buyers) in high-tech markets were particu-
larly focused. Results from the structural equation model and multiple regression analysis reveal that while the tech-
nological uncertainty has a positive effect on the network norm of information sharing, the volume uncertainty is not 
statistically significant. In addition, we find that there existsthe mediator effect of the network norm of information 
sharing in the relation between the uncertainties and the network embeddedness.  
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t is the business market that strong and competitive 
firms continue to flood andforce manufacturersto pro-
actively exploit a variety of superior business practic-
es. Although it is largely time consuming and cost 
intensive, working together with exchange partners is a 
firm’s the strategic decision with expectation that the calcu-
lative commitment would pay off through long-term rela-
tionship (Achrol 1997; Beckman, Haunschildand Phillips 
2004; Dreyer andGronhaug 2004; Nooteboom, Berger 
andNoorderhaven 1997). In responding to the needs for 
achieving management efficiency and sustainable growth, 
firms strategically exchange the resources and assets with 
their relational partners. In marketing, this strategic deci-
sion depending on a strong relationship with partners has 
been viewed as a significant social capital in business eco-
nomics (Levin and Cross 2004).  
In the exchange relationship where firm’s resources 
and assets ought to be exchanged among relational partners 
over time, explicit or implicit safeguarding mechanisms 
(e.g., contract, monitoring, trust) play an important role in 
protectingtheir quasi-rented resources and assets, andin 
determining the quality and performance of inter-firm rela-
tionship management. Interestingly, researchers in inter-
firm relationship have found that not all firms use same 
safeguarding mechanisms even though they are in the same 
industry (Ghosh and John 1999 JM; Heide 1994; Palmatier, 
Dant, and Grewal 2007).  
The current research aims to explain the underlying 
causes. More specifically, the main purpose of this research 
is to study the network embeddedness under environmental 
uncertainty. Although prior studies enhanced our under-
standing of environmental uncertainty in inter-firm rela-
tionship management, researchers have too narrowly 
viewed the environmental uncertainty and often threated it 
as one of external variables impacting on the relationship 
management. For example, during the neoclassical transac-
tion period, the assumption that there exist no quality or 
value variations of a homogeneous product was toomini-
malist and consequently ignored the role of environmental 
uncertainty in business market (Hobbs 1996). However, the 
volatility of the market is inevitable due to the forces de-
rived from customers. the role of environmental uncertainty 
in relationship management should be considered within a 
whole economic system where economic behavior is not 
autonomous but largely interdependent (Andersson, Holm, 
and Johanson 2007; Coleman 1988, 1990; McEvily and 
Zaheer 1999; Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt 2000; Uzzi 
1996). With this perspective, not surprisingly, the research-
ers in relationship marketing have studied the environmen-
tal uncertainty over the past 30 years (Bensaou and Ander-
son 1999; Walker and Weber 1984, 1987).  
Essentially, the current research focuses on the for-
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mation of the network embeddedness where the environ-
mental uncertainty leads the network embeddedness 
through the network norm of information sharing. This 
view contributes to the relationship marketing literature in 
two ways. First, prior relationship marketing studies have 
mainly focused on the dyadic relationships where the unit 
of data analysis and the focal research interest are centered 
on the exchange relationshipsmainly between two relational 
partners (Anderson, Håkansson and Johanson 1994; Hagen 
and Choe 1998; John and Reve 1982; Rowley 1997; Hite 
and Hesterly 2001). However, the network relationship 
where the relationships among the main firm, its immediate 
partners, and their second tier partners are loosely coupled 
has obtained insufficient attentions in relationship market-
ing literature (Madhavan, Gnyawali, and He 2004). The 
current research tackles the research gap by focusing on a 
triadic network relationship of which consists of a main 
firm (manufacturing company or seller), first relational 
partners (immediate buyers, first vendor), and their rela-
tional partners (end buyers, second vendor).  
Second, although researchers in inter-firm relationship 
recognized the importance of information sharing in rela-
tional exchange (Wu 2008), only little research has ques-
tioned how environmental uncertainty that has been caused 
by technology and volume uncertainty leads the network 
embeddedness (Ki and Yang 2015). To answer the ques-
tion, the current research empirically tests that there exists 
the mediating effect of the network norm of information 
sharing in the relationship between the technological and 
the volume uncertainty, and the network embeddedness. 
This paper consists of three main parts. The first sec-
tion discusses the theoretical background of network theo-
ry, transaction cost, and information sharing, and then illus-
trates our proposed theoretical framework and the research 
hypotheses. In the next section, we empirically testthe pro-
posed model with the data from the manufactures in the 
high-tech market. Data analysis assessed the degree of 
which the technology and the volume uncertainty affect the 
network norm of information sharing and its moderating 
effect on the network embeddedness. The last part high-
lights the conclusion and discussions about the importance 
of information sharing in interfirm relationships, along with 
the areas of further research. 
 
 
Theoretical Background 
 
Network Embeddedness 
According to the network theory, the network embed-
dedness explains why some powerful firms do not take their 
instant economic gains from their vulnerable partners where 
there is no contractual relationship, and also the opportun-
ism could have easily taken advantages from the trust and 
reciprocity relationship (Powell 1990; Smitka 1991; Uzzi 
1996). Studies using the network theory have construed the 
reasonsusing the network embeddedness. 
The network embeddedness has the three perspectives: 
structural embeddedness, relational embeddedness, and 
cognitive embeddedness (Simsek, Lubarkinand Floyd 
2003). Structural embeddedness is the status of either the 
presence or absence of ties among actors. Relational em-
beddedness refers to the degree to which partners consider 
their mutual needs and goals, and expect their behaviors in 
favorable to their exchange partners. The relational embed-
dedness determines the strength or density of the net-
work(Simsek, Lubatkinand Floyd 2003). Cognitive embed-
dedness pertains to the similarity in the representations, 
interpretations, and systems of meaning among firms (Na-
hapietandGhoshal 1998).  
By extending the prior work by Hite (2003), the cur-
rent research concentrates on the relational embeddedness 
that specifically focuses on the way of how multiple rela-
tional actors could achieve their business goals. According 
to Uzziin his research (1997), there are two relational em-
beddedness forms in exchange relationships: first, the arm’s 
length ties called “market relationships” and second, the 
embedded ties called “close or special relationships.” The 
typical characteristic of arm’s length ties is the lack of reci-
procity between exchange partners, the non-repetitive na-
ture of the interaction, and narrow economic matters (Uzzi 
1997, p 41). Thus, the market relationship is commonly 
studied in economic literature where pure competition is 
greatly assumed. Granovetter (1983) regards the arm’s 
length ties as weak ties and distinguishes the weak times 
from the embedded ties (i.e., strong ties). He suggests that 
the strong tiescan be formulated byconstant transactions 
among partners. In addition, Hansen (1999) mentions that 
strong ties naturally increase the frequency of interactions 
and communications among partners, eventually decrease 
monitoring costs, and significantly shorten the decision-
making process even in handling a complex problem. Thus, 
the strong ties help firms overcome challenges in safe-
guarding their shared resourceswith exchange partners, and 
further realize the existence of available resources and 
business opportunities that could strategically lead the pi-
eexpansion output (Hite andHesterly 2001; Jap 1999).  
 
Environmental Uncertainty and Transaction Cost 
Analysis 
Transaction cost analysis (TCA) consists of various ex-ant 
and ex-post costs resulted from the frictions occurred dur-
ing the relationship development process by exchange part-
ners, including the costs of screening the qualified partner, 
negotiating after contract, monitoring opportunism, enforc-
ing a contingent claims contract, and of evaluating partner’s 
performance (Heide 1994; Hill 1990; Williamson 1973). 
The current research focuses on the environmental uncer-
tainty in which transaction costs are created due to the ad-
aptation of environmental uncertainty, and the opportunity 
coststhat could have avoided by choosing alternatives. 
According to Hobbs (1996), he argues that “the stand-
ard neoclassical transaction implies the exchange of a ho-
mogeneous product that there is no quality variations be-
tween products and consequently no costs involved in 
measuring the value of a product. Where products do exhib-
it quality differences, they are regarded as distinct products 
serving separate markets. Economic agents are assumed to 
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possess perfect information, hence, there is no uncertainty 
regarding pricing, product characteristics, or the behavior of 
competitors and trading partners.” 
Although the neoclassical approach enhanced our un-
derstanding of relationship management, there has been 
little focused on social relationships, an important form of 
capital and asset useful in the market (Adler and Kwon 
2002; Burt 1997; Coleman 1988; Inkpenand Tsang 2005; 
Kokaand Prescott 2002; NahapietandGhoshal 1998).The 
promise of the social relationships approach is that firms 
cannot exist in isolation in the market. Besides, the close 
relationships are the firm’scritical asset that its competitors 
are difficult to copy, and thus not all firms can obtain easi-
ly. Nevertheless, firms are very difficult to ignore their own 
advantages that could easily extract from the existing rela-
tionship with their partners. According to Aldrich (1979), it 
is the uncertainty that is fundamentally caused by human’s 
bounded rationality. The uncertainty that leads the adapta-
tion costs and information processing problems results in 
the partner’s opportunism. Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) 
also explain that decision makers have constraints in their 
cognitive capabilities that are often explained as the bound-
ed rationality. Any changing circumstances under the 
bounded rationality make decision makers more difficult to 
handle the environmental uncertainty. Opportunistic behav-
ior becomes an effective short-term solution to pay off the 
adaptation costs induced from the environmental uncertain-
ty.  
Williamson (1985, p. 47) defines opportunism as 
“self-interest seeking with guile” and suggests that it in-
cludes such behaviors as lying and cheating, as well as 
more subtle forms of deceit, such as violating agreements. 
In economics and other social science disciplines, oppor-
tunism is a common motivation, and a strong form of the 
self-interest (Ghoshaland Moran 1996). Evidently, even a 
firm under the long-term relationship with its partners may 
unscrupulously seek to serve their self-interests. Jap and 
Anderson (2003, p.1696) concerned, “the counterpart’s 
performance is better, more competitive advantages are 
achieved by the pairing, joint profits are higher, and the 
relationship is expected to last longer. These effects appar-
ently diminish, even evaporate, as ex post opportunism 
mounts.” In addition, Barney (1999) emphasizes that it is 
difficult to know a priori who is trustworthy and who is not.  
The researchers in TCA literature have greatly studied 
the safeguarding problemsand the governance mechanisms 
as strategic solutions. For example, theexchange partner’s 
opportunistic behavior can be suppressed by planning the 
process of which future contingencies and consequential 
duties and responsibilities are to occur in the on-going ex-
changes (Macaulay 1963), monitoring the extent to which 
contractual compliance has taken place (Heide 1994), and 
enforcing the fiat and contact (Ghoshaland Moran 1996). 
According to the TCA theory, if these costs are enormous 
and may lead to a crisis with the standing and management 
of the company, a deterministic solution is to internalize the 
transactions. When transactions are internalized, it is un-
necessary to anticipate all contingencies leading to complex 
negotiations(Granovetter 1985), which offer the theoretical 
foundation of the vertically integrated structure among 
channel members.According to the research by John and 
Weitz (1988), “vertically integrated structures permit se-
quential, adaptive decision making to proceed more 
smoothly because of administrative mechanisms. Authority 
structures permit quicker resolution of conflicts arising 
from differing interpretations of the evolving circumstanc-
es. These structures enhance the information flow between 
the parties, thus enabling them to react better to the uncer-
tainties.” However, what if the vertical integration is not 
feasible? How could the relationship partners minimize the 
transactions costs? The current research aims to answer the 
question by understanding the characteristics of network 
form of information sharing. 
 
Network Norm of Information Sharing 
Relational norms such as solidarity, flexibility, information 
exchange, role integrity, and long-term orientation govern 
the complexity of relationships among firms of which a 
contractenforcement is largely ineffective because of the 
great degree of uncertainty embedded in channel relation-
ship (Antinaand Frazier 2001; Ganesan 1994; Kaufmann 
and Stern 1988). By extending the prior studies in relational 
norms, the norm of information sharing is defined as an 
expectation that relationship partners proactively sharestra-
tegic information each other (Antinaand Frazier 2001; 
Heide and John 1992; Flazier, Maltz, Antia, and Rind-
fleisch 2009). Drawing on the channel relationship litera-
ture, inter-firm relationship studies, and network theory, the 
current research views the norm of information sharing as a 
network norm that is a necessary ingredient of trilateral 
relationship. In addition, the current research empirically 
investigates the norm of information sharing among rela-
tionship partners where their spontaneous alliance quickly 
responding to the needs for fast moving consumer market, 
and to suppress suppliers’ opportunistic behavior caused by 
the failure of technology adaptation in the high-tech market 
(Antina and Frazier 2001; Devlin and Bleackley 1988; Dyer 
1997; Heide and Weiss 1995).  
Considering the triadic relationships between a manu-
facturer (seller), firstvendors (first buyers), and second ven-
dors (their customers or second buyers),the manufacturer 
often confronts to the “make” or “buy” decision problem in 
technology (Heide 1994; Heide and Weiss 1995; Walker 
and Weber 1987). For example, if a manufacture that de-
veloped (“make”) a new technology, the first vendors (first 
buyers) will be asked to negotiate how to share the in-
creased costs by the manufacture’s investment. This negoti-
ation process results in the ex-post costs. Even if the manu-
facturer purchased (“buy”) the new technology so that the 
cost sharing problem may be trivial, the unanticipated and 
various needs from the second vendors (the first vendors’ 
customers) will still result in the ex-post costs from the 
maladaptation. Imagine that what if the second vendors are 
not ready tocustomize their production routine and system 
in favorable to the new technology. 
They would behavior opportunistically to avoid the 
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adaptation costs. Therefore, the manufacture is difficult to 
decide if the “make” or “buy” decision in technology would 
be profitable or not (Auster 1992; Teece 1986, Atuahene-
Gimaand Li 2004; Bensaouand Anderson 1999; Walker and 
Weber 1987). To overcome the difficulty in choosing 
the“make” or “buy” decision in technology, we argue that a 
manufacturer should keep in touch with its first vendors 
(first buyers)toobtainthe useful informationthat wouldhelp 
the manufacture prepare how to minimize potential con-
flicts with the first vendors (first buyers), and how to strate-
gically influencetheir customers (second buyers)’ technolo-
gy adaptation(Frazier and Rody 1991). With this backdrop, 
we argue that the norm of information sharing is a useful 
channel governance strategy particularly when the volatility 
of technology is likely to hamper the relationship among 
partnersand thus to decrease the relationship performance. 
Prior studies in the norm of information sharing literature 
have demonstrated its effect on firm’s performance by re-
ducing costs of operation process and market information 
acquisition (Humphreys, Li and Chan 2004), promoting 
collaborative communication under uncertainty (Daft 
andLengel 1986; Galbraith 1973), enhancing the product 
quality (Takeishi 2001), and dissolving delivery schedule 
compliance (Brown andEisenhardt 1995). In summary, 
when the volatility of technology is high and increases 
technological uncertainty in high-tech markets, the relation-
al partners in triadic relationships will greatly rely on the 
shared information. Taken together, we posit the hypothesis 
as following; 
 
H1: The technological uncertainty is positively associated 
with the network norm of information sharing. 
 
Over time, relationship partners come to realize that it 
is important to strengthen their relationship through con-
sistently exchanging their resources involving their assets, 
sensitive and unique information, and specific relationship 
investment (Bensaouand Anderson 1999; Rokkan, Heide, 
and Wathne 2003). The benefits of relational exchange 
areimportantparticularly when the market and product life 
cycle are short, needs of product diversity of product is 
high, and firms are very difficult to predict the demand 
(volume) of products (Dreyer andGronhaug 2004; Krish-
nan, Martin andNoorderhaven 2006; Zhou, Yim,andTse 
2005). 
In the case of triadic relationships, for example, a 
manufacturer under the volume uncertainty is difficult toac-
curately predict how many products should be produced. It 
is also too risk for the firm to determine the specific quanti-
ty and delivery schedulethat the first vendors used to use 
under uncertainty. Besides, the uncertainty involume (de-
mand) uncertainty become even serious and result in gov-
ernance problems particularly when the first vendors (first 
buyers)make rush orders at the same time, inquire unrea-
sonable delivery schedule, or either cancel or delay their 
prior orders on behalf of their second vendors (second buy-
ers). The failure of handling the volume (demand) uncer-
tainty results in negative perception of the manufacturer 
likenon-cooperative partner.For example, the consequence 
induces the sequential damages. For example, the manufac-
ture’s first vendors (first buyers) are likely to threaten the 
contractual obligation with the manufacture’s cost (e.g., 
honoring the additional costs due to the delivery delay). 
The damaged relationship between the first vendors and 
their customers, the second vendors even make the first 
vendors to consider switching the manufacture with alterna-
tives. Prior studies in inter-firm relationship have continued 
to offer the empirical evidences that the failure of safe-
guarding the environmental uncertainty and the opportunis-
tic behavior could seriously hamper the long-term relation-
ship orientation (Bensaouand Anderson 1999; Ganesan 
1994; Heide and John 1992; Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 
2003).  
In summary, it is indeed a strategic choice that the 
manufacturer should make efforts to keep in touch with its 
relational partners where strategic and useful information 
plays an important role managing the triadic relationships. 
We posit the hypothesis as following;  
 
H2: The volume uncertainty is positively associated with 
the network norm of information sharing. 
  
Mediator Effect of the Network Norm of Infor-
mation Sharing  
The information sharing can be easily observedat the indi-
vidual level when workers engage in prosocial transfor-
mations such as wishing for a good outcome for themselves 
and others (Constant, KieslerandSporull 1994). Similarly, 
the information sharing is common at the organizational 
levelif the information sharing was “usual, correct, and so-
cially expected workplace behavior,” so that workers ra-
tionalize that it is useful not only for their own interests, but 
also for their organizations. Evidently, the marketing litera-
tures continue to suggest that firms can increase their prof-
its by information sharing in the inter-firm relationships. 
For example, to reduce operation costs, the information 
sharing among relational partners is useful to determine the 
inventory level, the right time to purchase raw materials, 
and the amounts of order (Lee, So and Tang 2000; Sa-
hinand Robinson Jr. 2005). In addition, organizations invest 
in collaborative information and communication systems to 
facilitate sharing of information to prevent potential dam-
age so that it helps firms foresee changing in future condi-
tions (Antinaand Frazier 2001; Constant et al. 1994; Jar-
venpaaand Staples 2000). Therefore, the information shar-
ing leads to a close relationship in business economics be-
cause it is a sign of the trustworthiness of the relational 
partners (Dyer 1997). We argue that the information shar-
ing is more critical in the context of triadic relationships. 
Stated differently, under a technologicaluncertainty envi-
ronment, the relationships between the existing triadic firms 
can be strengthened when the network norm of information 
sharing is working well.For example, in case of triadic rela-
tionships where a manufacturer and their network partners 
share useful information, the manufacturer could effectively 
respond to the market needs through the information that 
their first and second vendors (buyers) offer (e.g., new con-
sumer market trends, first vendor’s sales event planning, 
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second vendor’s competitors). In addition, even if the pre-
dicament circumstance due to the defective product prob-
lem occurred, the manufacturer could solve the problem 
fast and properly based on the shared information that helps 
the manufacturer comprehensively understand how the first 
and second vendors (buyers) confront to the problem ini-
tially.  
By dubbing the results by Sahin and Robinson Jr. 
(2005), we also argue that information sharing makes a firm 
possible to flexibly secure the complement in han-
dlingunpredictable situation. In terms of a trilateral rela-
tionship, for example, it is often that a manufacturer that is 
currently difficulty topredictthe future product volumes is 
still need to makegoods for the first vendors. The danger in 
preparing goods for the first vendors is that the manufactur-
er is largely uncertain what their second vendorswant, when 
these vendors order, and how many orders will be made. 
Given this uncertainty in the triadic relationships, the needs 
for the shared information are likely to increase for the pur-
pose of handling the manufacturer’s unpredictability, avoid-
inginventory crisis, and promoting strong relationships 
among relational partners. It is rational that if firms ex-
change knowledge with partners, more coordinating inter-
action will appear among them in order to convey the de-
mands as accurately as possible. Reversely speaking, when 
one of the actors fails to share information about issues 
involving the partners, the others feel anxious until the or-
der is filled. As a result, under volume uncertainty, the net-
work norm of information sharing is poor, and the triadic 
relationship is weakened. 
Accordingly, sharing helps firms to reduce the cost of 
inventory management and to perform at peak efficiency. 
Therefore, manufacturer and vendors endeavor to achieve 
maximum performance. This action creates a well-disposed 
organization and creates strong ties in the interfirm net-
work. Taken together, we posit the following hypothesis; 
 
H3: The greater the network norm of information sharing is 
the more the network embeddedness increases. 
 
 
Research Methods 
 
Research Context 
Recall that the current research aimed to investigate the 
effectiveness of network embeddedness on environment 
uncertainty in the context of the strong tie of triadic net-
work relationship. Our proposed model focuses on testing 
how the information sharing under unpredictable situations 
increases or decreases the network embeddedness. The re-
search context of this study is the relationships among 
manufacturers (seller), the first vendors (first buyers), and 
the second vendors (customers of the first buyers) in high-
tech markets. The manufacturers supply their products to a 
big Korean electronics company. The first vendors supply 
electronic goods to their customers (second vendors), and 
also are the buyers of complete products from the manufac-
turers. The manufacturers were contacted and asked to pro-
vide their perceptions of technological uncertainty and that 
of volume uncertainty. 
The data collection was performed using a mail survey 
distributing to the manufacturers. Sample frame (contact 
information) was obtained from the managers who current-
ly work for the manufactures. Before finalizing the ques-
tionnaire, a few selected managers were invited to partici-
pate in the pilot test to further validate the questionnaire. 
The final questionnaire went through several revisions. 
Questionnaires were mailed out together with a cover letter 
explaining the purpose of the survey. Four hundred ques-
tionnaires were sent to the manufactures. A total of 154 
(38.5%) completed surveys were returned. Among them, 
eleven questionnaires were removed from the final data 
analysis because of the excessive missing answers. There-
fore, a total of 143 firm-level data were used for the data 
analysis. 
 
FIGURE 1 
The Framework of Uncertainty-Network Embeddedness 
 
 
H2 
H1 
H3 
Network Norm of  
Information Sharing 
 
Technological 
Uncertainty 
Volume 
Uncertainty 
Network  
Embeddedness 
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TABLE1 
Results of the CFA for the Measurement Model 
Construct 
Lowest Standard-
ized Factor Load-
ing 
Highest Stand-
ardized Factor 
Loading 
CFA 
Tucker-
Lewis 
Index 
RMSEA 
𝑋2 
(d.f.) 
p-value 
Network Norm of 
Information Sharing  
.70 .83 
.95 .94 . 09𝑎 
183.688 
(83) 
p < .001 
Technological Un-
certainty 
.63 .89 
Volume Uncertainty .60 .74 
Network Embed-
dedness 
.76 .85 
 
 
𝑎 A more stringent RMSEA cutoff of .05 tends to reject properly specified models when sample sizes are close to
 100 (Yu 2002). 
 
TABLE2 
Measures of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) and Items Used in the Study 
 x11 x12 x13 x21 x22 x23 x31 x32 x33 x10 x34 y11 y12 
(x11) 
TechUn1 
.901
𝑎 
            
(x12) 
TechUn2 
-.078 
.733
𝑎 
           
(x13) 
TechUn3 
-.244 -.806 
.719
𝑎 
          
(x21) Vol-
Un1 
-.079 -.024 -.080 
.832
𝑎 
         
(x22) Vol-
Un2 
-.038 .000 .060 -.519 
.772
𝑎 
        
(x23) Vol-
Un3 
-.050 .031 -.109 -.079 -.102 
.701
𝑎 
       
(x24) Vol-
Un4 
.146 -.060 .019 -.032 -.117 -.723 
.667
𝑎 
      
(x31) 
NetEm1 
-.045 .189 -.163 -.005 .124 .001 .014 
.833
𝑎 
     
(x32) 
NetEm2 
-.012 -.139 .159 -.016 -.089 -.118 .156 -.754 
.843
𝑎 
    
(x33) 
NetEm3 
.065 -.107 .052 .086 -.052 .001 -.035 -.239 .008 
.862
𝑎 
   
(x34) 
NetEm4 
-.098 .000 -.003 -.079 .041 .083 -.065 .145 -.151 -.735 
.838
𝑎 
  
(y11)NIS1 -.087 .020 .020 .026 -.057 .086 -.039 -.043 -.233 -.030 .149 
.935
𝑎 
 
(y12)NIS2 -.087 -.024 .099 -.090 -.044 -.092 .076 .006 -.008 -.158 .078 -.138 
.952
𝑎 
(y13)NIS3 -.006 .078 -.046 .072 -.011 -.003 .043 -.198 .169 .217 -.492 -.112 -.071 
(y14)NIS4 .169 -.027 -.094 -.056 .035 -.003 -.055 .114 -.080 .073 -.185 -.385 -.301 
  
𝑎Measures of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) 
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Measures 
The four constructs in this proposed modelinclude the tech-
nological uncertainty, the volume uncertainty, the norm of 
network information sharing, and the network embed-
dedness. Whenever possible, the existing multi-item 
measures were used. If not, the existing scale items were 
modified and reworded in order to increase respondent un-
derstanding of research context. First, the technological 
uncertainty was adapted from Jaworski and Kohli (1993) 
and Stock and Tatikonda (2008). The managers in the man-
ufacturers were asked to estimate the degree of their per-
ceptions on technological uncertainty. The items composed 
of three scale items focused on the extent of perceived un-
predictable technological changes. Second, the volume un-
certainty was adapted from Germain, Dröge, and Christen-
sen (2001) and Zhou, Yim, and Tse (2005). Four items 
were selectedto measure the extent of the inability to accu-
rately forecast the demand for the goods in the external 
environment. Third, the network embeddedness scales 
composed of four items were adapted from Antina and Fra-
zier (2001) and Wu (2008) to assess the extent to which 
managers in manufacturers perceive strong and embedded 
ties with their exchange partners. Last, for the norm of net-
work information sharing, we relied on the four existing 
scale items developed by Antina and Frazier (2001. These 
items assess the degree to which the manufacturers and 
their partners keep sharing important information each oth-
er. All scale items were scored with the seven-point Likert 
scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). The meas-
urement items and the results of validity analyses are re-
ported in the Appendix. 
 
Construct Validity 
Before testing hypotheses, it is important to validate and 
purify the measures. The results from the exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) stringently asserted that the scales items 
used in the measurement model well reflected their con-
structs, and thus concluded the measurement model with all 
items for the four latent constructs (technological uncertain-
ty, volume uncertainty, network norm of information shar-
ing, and network embeddedness). In details, factor loading 
of the technological uncertainty were 0.63, 0.861 and 0.885. 
The volume uncertainty showed 0.597, 0.616, 0.736 and 
0.732. The network embeddedness obtained the factor load-
ings of 0.761, 0.79, 0.798 and 0.848 for each scale item. 
Items of the network norm of information sharing obtained 
0.765, 0.704, 0.812 and 0.832 of factor loadings. 
To evaluate the internal consistency of four constructs, 
Cronbach’s alpha was used to test the extent to how well 
the selected scale items consistently reflected their con-
struct. The results showed that Cronbach’s alpha for all 
constructs was higher than 0.8 (lowest =0.82; highest 
=0.94), which exceeded the cut-off level (0.7) of the norm 
of acceptable reliability (Bagozzi and Yi 2012). In addition, 
the composite reliability of all constructors showed higher 
than 0.7 (i.e., the technological uncertainty factor=0.84, the 
volume uncertainty factor=0.77, the network embeddedness 
factor=0.88, the network norm of information shar-
ing=0.86), which exceeded the cut-off level (0.7) of the 
norm of acceptable reliability (Bagozzi and Yi 2012). 
To test both convergent and discriminant validity, the 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model was used (e.g., 
Anderson and Gerbing 1988; Bagozzi and Yi 2012; Grewal, 
Chakravarty and Saini 2010). In testing the convergent va-
lidity, the CFA results showed that all factor loadings of 
scale items were statistically significant (p<0.001) and the 
goodness of fit indexes of the measurement model close to 
or above the recommended levels based on Bagozzi and Yi 
(2012, Table 1).  
For the discriminant validity, the measures of sam-
pling adequacy (MSA) for the model and calculated indica-
tors were evaluated (Table 2). Additionally, average vari-
ance extracted (AVE) values were calculated on the basis of 
factor loadings. AVE values of factors were 0.69 of techno-
logical uncertainty, 0.55 of volume uncertainty, 0.69 of 
network embeddedness and 0.67 of network norm of infor-
mation sharing. These indices were satisfactory because the 
AVE values of each construct were greater than the cut-off 
benchmark value (0.5) (Poppo, Zhou and Ryu 2008). In  
 
TABLE3 
Descriptive Statistics, AVE, Composite Reliability, and Correlation Matrix of  
Variables Included in the Study (n=143) 
 
Mean Std. AVEa X1 X2 X3 Y1 
(X1) Technological Uncertainty 5.48 1.09 .69 .84b    
(X2) Volume Uncertainty 4.27 1.23 .56 .38** .77b   
(X3) Network Norm of Information Sharing  3.85 1.12 .69 .32* .17* .88b  
(Y1) Network Embeddedness 5.80 0.98 .67 .32** .09 0.85** .86b 
  
* p <0.05 ** p < 0.01 
a. Denotes Average Variance Extracted 
b. Composite Reliability 
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addition, the estimated measurement correlation scores of 
each indicator of each latent variable were significantly 
different from 1.0 (Anderson and Gerbing 1988; Table 3). 
The measurement model fit indices was shown as follow-
ing: χ2(83) =183.688 (p<0.001); Incremental fix index [IFI] 
=.95; Goodness fix index [GFI] =.85; Comparative Fix In-
dex [CFI] =.95, Root Mean square Residual [RMR] =.14; 
Root Mean Square Error of approximation [RMSEA] =.09. 
All values except RMR were statistically significant. The 
goodness-of-fit index, composite reliability, average vari-
ance extracted indices, and model fit, were reported in the 
appendix in detail. We concluded that our measurement 
model was shown to possess satisfactory reliability and 
construct validity for the further data analysis. 
 
 
Data Analyses and Results 
 
Both structural equation modeling (SEM) using AMOS, 
and multiple regression analysis using IBM-SPSS were 
used to test the hypotheses. The basic idea of the SEM is 
similar to the regression analysis. However, the parameter 
estimates using the SEM have been known to lead to accu-
rate results by simultaneously estimating structural relations 
and less restrictive assumptions in selecting the variables 
(Bollen 2014). In the SEM test, the procedures of Luo 
(2003) and Grewal et al. (2010) was adopted to estimate 
three models: as shown in Table 4, Model 1 with technolog-
ical uncertainty as an exogenous variable to network norm 
of information sharing as an endogenous variable; and 
Model 2 with volume uncertainty as an exogenous variable 
to network norm of information sharing as an endogenous 
variable; Model 3 with network norm of information shar-
ing as mediator and independent variable in one to network 
embeddedness as an endogenous variable. To obtain rigor-
ous results, relations between technological and volume 
uncertainties on network embeddedness was also conducted 
(Model 4). Results from both SEM and multiple regression 
analysis provided strong results for the hypotheses test as 
following; 
The multiple regression analysis tested the relation-
ship among constructs shown in the proposed conceptual 
model as illustrated in Figure 1. First, we testedifthe uncer-
tainty variable was associated with the network embed-
dedness. Theadjusted R square of technological uncertainty 
on network embeddedness was .097, with the R square of 
.104. To examine potential multi-collinearity problem 
among the predictors, variance inflation factor (VIF) asso-
ciated with each of the predictors in the model was comput-
ed. Results showed that the VIF was 1.00, which was below 
the cut-off value of 10, suggesting the existence of no mul-
ti-collinearity problem. Moreover, the Durbin-Watson value 
was 1.756, which shoed the acceptable range nearly 2. 
From the ANOVA results, the F value was 16.295 
(p<0.001) where p value of coefficient of both a constant 
and the technological uncertainty were less than 0.001 
(p<0.001).To test the mediator effect of the network norm 
of information sharing, we ran the multiple regression anal-
ysis again to see the adjusted R square valueof the model 
regressing two independent variables including technologi-
cal uncertainty and network norm of information sharing 
independent variable on the network embeddedness as a 
dependent variable. It was0.721, which was originally 
0.725 R square.Durbin-Watson value was 1.874 and F sta-
tistic was 184.281 (p<0.001). Results showed thatthe net-
work norm of information sharing was significant 
(p<0.001) but technological uncertainty was not significant 
(p =0.25). Therefore, the mediator effect of the network 
norm of information sharingwas supported.Second, we test-
ed ifthe volume uncertainty was associated with the net-
work embeddedness and then if the mediator effect of the 
network norm of information sharing was hold.Results 
showed that the adjusted R square of volume uncertainty on 
network embeddedness was .000, with the R square of .007. 
It means that independent variable can explain dependent 
variable only 7 percent, but this R square’s demerit was 
supplemented to 0 percent. Furthermore, the F value was 
1.054 (p=0.306) From the ANOVA results. Thus, the fur-
 
TABLE4 
The Results of Regression Analysis 
   Dependent Variables 
   
Network Norm of 
Information Sharing 
Network Embeddedness 
Independent variables  
Hypothesized 
Effect 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
      
Technological Uncertainty Positive 
0.36*** 
(0.114) 
  
0.07 
(0.046) 
Volume Uncertainty No direct  
-0.07 
(0.074) 
 
-0.04 
(0.031) 
Network Norm of Information Sharing Positive   
0.91*** 
(0.076) 
 
 
Note: Goodness-of-Model fit (Model 1 to 3), 𝜒2(83)=183.688, p<0.001, GFI=0.85, CFI=0.95; RMSEA=0.09; The entries in 
the table are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses; *** refers to p < 0.001. 
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ther analysis testing the mediation effect of the network 
norm of information sharing was not performed (see results 
from Model 1 and 2 in table 4) 
 
Hypotheses Testing 
H1assesses the network logic that a high level of technolog-
ical uncertainty induces a high level of network norm of 
information sharing. As shown in Table 4, Model 1 showed 
the relationship between technological uncertainty and net-
work norm of information sharing was statistically signifi-
cant (H1=0.36, p<0.001). However, H2 regarding the rela-
tion between volume uncertainty and network norm of in-
formation sharing was not supported (Model 2; p>.40). Alt-
hough the network norm of information sharing and volume 
uncertainty marginally showed correlation positively (Table 
3), the results did not support for H2.Regarding H3positing 
that the network norm of information sharing increases 
network embeddedness found in Model 3, it showed signif-
icant support (p<0.001). Additionally, we tested a rival 
model where all were as same as our proposed model but 
there was no mediation effect. More specifically, we ana-
lyzed the direct pathmodel (Model 4) that technological 
uncertainty causedthe network embeddedness and volume 
uncertainty caused the network embeddedness. The results 
were not significant. The path of technological uncertainty 
on network embeddedness was over p-value 0.1 and the 
path of volume uncertainty on network embeddedness was 
over p-value 0.4.As shown by the overall analysis, we con-
cluded that the network norm of information sharing was a 
critical source of network embeddedness as a mediator be-
tweenthe uncertainty and the network embeddedness. 
 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
Recall that the main purpose of this research is to study the 
network embeddedness under environmental uncertainty. 
Based on the results from the data analysis, we found that it 
was fascinating to see actors in business-to-business rela-
tionships actually rely on the network embeddedness to 
proactively respond to the unpredictable market challenges 
induced by technical and volume uncertainty. Our conven-
tional wisdom is that working together with other firms is 
often time-consuming and cost-intensive, and even very 
risky particularly when uncertainty promotes the partner’s 
opportunism. However, our findings provided the opposite 
evidences that when technical and volume uncertainties 
were high, direct and indirect exchange partners greatly 
formulated the network norm of information sharing and 
strategically used the network embeddedness. We reasoned 
that even if the uncertainty is seemingly difficult to control 
so that the partner’s opportunistic behavior is greatly ex-
pected, the skillful managers who have experienced the 
benefits of the network embeddedness realizethat the shared 
important information sharing will determine the degree of 
business performance. 
This researchaims to fillthe gap in the research on 
network embeddedness and uncertainty in the triadic rela-
tionship. Although network performance relationships (Ja-
worskiandKohli 1993; Tsai 2001; Zaheerand Bell 2005) 
and uncertainty network partner selection (Beckman, 
Haunschildand Phillips 2004; Shane and Cable 2002) im-
proved our knowledge of relationship management, previ-
ous studies mostly have focused on either uncertainty (Car-
penter and Fredrickson 2001), network ties (Williamson 
and Cable 2003), technological uncertainty (Dess and 
Beard 1984), or volume uncertainty separately. However, 
this research specifically focused on the relationship be-
tween the uncertainty and the network embedded ties. In 
explain the relationship, we first integrated the transaction 
cost analysis and the network theory. Our results were 
promising for the researchers who study the effectiveness 
of the relational mechanism. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Nonetheless, this research contributed to theoretical and 
practical development. There exist limitations that should 
be considered in further research. First, the research context 
selected in this research was limited to the high-tech mar-
kets where partner’s dependence is naturally high due to the 
complexity of technology implementation. Our proposed 
model needs to be tested in the conventional relationship 
between manufactures and their suppliers that deal with 
commodity products (e.g., raw materials, standardized 
components). We predict that the network embeddedness 
will be consistently important, but its antecedents may be 
different (like organizational memories focusing on inter-
firm routines). Second, although this research considered 
the triadic relationship among manufacturers, first vendor, 
and second vendor, the data that we collected only captured 
the manufacturers’ point of view.A future research should 
test the relationship between uncertainty and network em-
beddednessbased on the data collected from the trilateral 
relationship. The future research should be dealt with not 
only a manufacturer’s response but also partners’ responses 
in triadic relationships. Third, subsequent modifications 
become necessary due to a variety of possible contingencies 
(Carson andMadhock 2006). A future research is recom-
mended to include the firm’s flexibility as extension of the 
current model. The flexibility is one of the important rela-
tional properties that are useful to handlethe market uncer-
tainty, and encourageexchange partners to behave coopera-
tively (Cannon, Achrol and Gundlach 2000). Finally, the  
network embeddedness as safeguarding mechanism against 
opportunism has never been considered(Carson 
andMadhock 2006). 
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Appendix: Scale Items Used in This Study 
Constructa Itemb Sources 
Technological 
Uncertainty 
Your industry’s technology was correctly presented. 
(R) 
Stock and Tatikonda (2008) 
Sufficient information about a technology in your 
industry is available. (R) 
Stock and Tatikonda (2008) 
The technology in your industry is changing rapidly.  Jaworski and Kohli (1993) 
   
Volume Uncer-
tainty 
It is difficult to anticipate consumer demand for a 
brand.  
Zhou, Yim and Tse (2005) 
Sales are predictable … unpredictable Germain, Dröge and Christensen 
(2001) 
Market trends are easy to monitor … difficult to 
monitor 
Germain, Dröge and Christensen 
(2001) 
Sales forecast are likely to be accurate … inaccurate Germain, Dröge and Christensen 
(2001) 
   
Network Norm 
of Information 
Sharing 
It is expected that any information that might help our 
company will be provided by first and second ven-
dors. 
Antina and Frazier (2001) 
It is expected that the first vendor will provide propri-
etary information about a second vendor if it can help 
our company, and vice versa. 
Antina and Frazier (2001) 
Exchange of information in our company with part-
ners (both first and second vendors) takes place fre-
quently and informally. 
Antina and Frazier (2001) 
It is expected that our company and partners keep 
each other informed about events or changes. 
 
Antina and Frazier (2001) 
   
Network Em-
beddedness 
Our company (manufacturing company) has estab-
lished good working relationships with our business 
partners.  
Wu (2008) 
Our company (manufacturing company) has a group 
of close business partners.  
Wu (2008) 
Our company (manufacturing company) engages in 
frequent communication with partners.  
Antina and Frazier (2001) 
There is a variety of interaction among our partners.  Antina and Frazier (2001) 
  
a Goodness-of-fit: 𝜒2(83)=183.688, p=0.000;  
GFI=0.85, CFI=0.95, TLI=0.94, IFI=0.95, RMSEA=0.09 
b 7-point likert scale with strongly disagree and strongly agree as anchors   
R refers to reverse scored item 
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